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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I show that Japan will not be able to have a viable banking sector without
stopping deflation.  The banking industry has not shown a profit since fiscal 1993 (ended March
1994) if one excludes capital gains from stock and real estate portfolios.  I quantify the financial
condition of the sector and show that interest margins have been too low to cover the increase in
loan losses brought about by the weak economy.
Banks cannot raise margins for several reasons: competition with subsidized government
sponsored financial institutions (GFIs); intense political pressure, backed by the Financial Services
Agency (FSA), to make new loans to small and medium companies; and deflation-weakened
borrowers. I expect that the Japanese government will have to nationalize most of the banking sector
by 2005. Capital injections will not solve the problems.
Established Japanese life insurance companies are also troubled because they over-promised
the amount that they could pay.  This can be corrected through a reorganization where the promised
interest rates are cut.  But this is complicated because Japanese banks and life insurance companies
are providing each other capital – a practice called double-gearing.  Weakened banks ask insurance
companies to provide equity capital and subordinated loans.  In return, the mutual life insurers ask
banks to subscribe their surplus notes (similar to non-voting redeemable preferred shares) and
subordinated debt.  The risks of double-gearing are analyzed.
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The Japanese economy's average annual real growth rate was only 0.8% from 1991 to 2001.  
Reflecting the weak economy, Japan has not been able to restore stability in its financial 
sector even though more than a decade has passed since the 1980s bubble.  The Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) has had a zero nominal interest rate policy most of the time since February 1999, 
but it has been ineffective because of deflation.  By the end of 2001, the GDP deflator was 
about 7% below its 1994 peak when adjusted for the 1997 consumption tax hike.  The index 
was falling at annual rate of 1.5% at the end of 2001.  Given the estimated 6% deflationary 
GDP gap and expected negative real growth in 2002, deflation is likely to accelerate to more 
than 2.0% by early 2003. (See JCER 2002, ch 1). 
In this chapter, I show that Japan will not be able to have a viable banking sector 
without stopping deflation.  The banking industry has not shown a profit since fiscal 1993 
(ended March 1994) if one excludes capital gains from stock and real estate portfolios.  
Interest margins have been too low to cover the increase in loan losses brought about by the 
weak economy. 
Banks cannot raise margins for several reasons: competition with subsidized 
government sponsored financial institutions (GFIs); intense political pressure, backed by the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA), to make new loans to small and medium companies; and 
deflation-weakened borrowers. I expect that the Japanese government will have to 
nationalize most of the banking sector by 2005. Capital injections will not solve the 
problems. 
Established Japanese life insurance companies also face a serious situation.  In the 
1980s and early 1990s they promised high minimum yields on long-term contracts.  For 
whatever reason, the companies did not match these long-term liabilities with long-term 
fixed-income investments.  Under the BOJ zero-interest rate policy, insurers thus are 
suffering large negative carry. (Carry is the industry term for the difference between a 
product's income and its associated costs). 
A complicating factor in this dire picture is banks and life insurance companies 
providing each other capital  – a practice called double-gearing.  Weakened banks ask 
insurance companies to provide equity capital and subordinated loans.  In return, the mutual 
life insurers ask banks to subscribe their surplus notes (similar to non-voting redeemable 
preferred shares) and subordinated debt.  When Chiyoda Life failed in October 2000, Tokai 
Bank lost ¥74 billion. The Financial Services Agency (FSA) actively encourages this 




publicly stated that double-gearing among financial institutions is highly beneficial to 
enhance public confidence (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 27 Nov 2001). 
The life insurers' problem is easier to solve than the banks' problem.  Using a 
reorganization procedure, life insurance companies can fail, and cut promised interest rates 
on their policies.  On the other hand, banks runs would ensue if the government did not 
fully pay the depositors of a failed large bank because a large part of the banking sector is 
either insolvent or very nearly so.  In such a situation, the government would have to bear 
the full brunt of defaulting loans at a time when its own debt to GDP ratio is rising by 10 
percentage points a year.  If things continue as they are, the Japanese government is unlikely 
to maintain investment-grade credit ratings on its bonds. 
The chapter continues with an analysis of banks' bad loans and their under-reserving 
for them. The deteriorating condition of banks is then considered, and the causes of bank 
unprofitability examined. As part of this, the effects of deregulation and the role of 
government-sponsored financial institutions is considered. Turning to life insurance 
companies, their problems and weak supervision are discussed. The risks of the banks and 
insurers engaging in double-gearing is then analyzed. 
 
 
1  Banks' Bad Loans 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 show data on problem loans of Japanese banks.  Japanese banks have 
acknowledged ¥82 trillion in losses from bad loans for the ten years through March 2002.  
In spite of this enormous loss, they still have more than ¥42 trillion of disclosed bad loans, 
about 8% of their loan portfolios. 
I am one of the many who feel the disclosed figures understate the real situation.  
The FSA collects data on "classified loans", a broader concept of problem loans, but does not 
discloses it for individual banks.  Under the FSA's Bank Examination Manual, banks are 
required to rate their loans, taking account of default risk and quality of collateral. There are 
four grades: normal, substandard, doubtful, and estimated-loss loans.  The last three are 
considered "classified" loans. Banks then estimate their loan-loss reserves and the amount of 
write-offs.  Because of the broader definition, the amount of classified loans is almost twice 
that of disclosed bad loans. Total classified loans for all banks was ¥71.1 trillion in March 




1.1  Under-Reserving 
 
Total loan loss reserves of Japanese banks have been low relative to those of US banks.  
While US bad loans declined from 3% of total loans in 1992 to 1% in 1999, the Japanese 
ratio rose from 2% to 6% (Figure 1).  Loan-loss reserves in the United States have been 
above 160% of bad loans since 1994, while in Japan they have been in the 40% to 60% range 
(Figure 2).  We can clearly see that although the US banking sector recovered quickly from 
its bad-loan problems in early 1990s, the Japanese situation has been deteriorating even with 
the 1999 capital injection by the government. 
Many analysts of Japanese banks suspect that the banks are not recording enough 
loan-loss reserves.  This problem is exacerbated by the lenient reserving policy stipulated by 
the FSA Bank Examination Manual. Japanese banks usually calculate loan-loss reserves by 
dividing their loans into the FSA-mandated categories, then estimated losses for each group 
using the following time horizons. 
 
1  Normal loans and sub-standard loans without arrears or reduced interest rates:  
expected one-year loss rate; 
2  Sub-standard loans with arrears or reduced interest rates and doubtful loans:  
expected three-year loan loss rate; 
 
Most loans are routinely rolled over, so the one-year figures understate the net present value 
of future losses over the true life of the loans in category (1).  Thus, instead of a one-year 
rate, banks should reserve using, as a minimum, the three-year cumulative rate for all 
sub-standard loans. 
To estimate more appropriate reserve figures, I have estimated required loan loss 
reserves based on FSA data of classified loans.  A Bank of Japan (1997) sample study 
looked at the actual subsequent loan losses of 18 banks for each category of classified loans 
on their fiscal 1993 reports (Table 3). At the end of three years (in March 1997) about 17% of 
substandard loans and  over 75% of doubtful loans had been lost and almost 100% of 
estimated loss loans. 
These figures indicate that banks should keep larger loan loss reserves. I have 




doubtful loans, and 1% of normal loans. This last is because of the migration of normal loans 
to classified loans. The results are in Table 2 row C. 
By comparing rows C and D, we can estimate the lower bound of under-reserving 
(row C minus row D).  Although substantially below the estimated 1997 level, 
under-reserving remains large. 
 
 
2  The Banks' Deteriorating Condition 
 
Figure 3 provides further evidence of the deteriorating condition of banks.  Although the 
bad-loan to total-loan ratio has stabilized for city banks, for first- and second-tier regional 
banks it has been increasing rapidly.  The large 1995 increase for regional banks in part 
reflects changes in disclosure requirements, but the trend since is due primarily to 
deteriorating loan quality. 
Corresponding to the flow – profit – figures, the capital position of Japanese banks 
has been deteriorating.  Under Japanese accounting rules for banks and lenient application 
by the regulators, BIS capital ratios have been manipulated in many ways. 
First, banks have under-reserved against bad loans, as explained above.  This tends 
to increase bank core capital by the same amount. 
Second, banks have large deferred-tax assets on their balance sheets even though they 
have been losing money continually since 1993 and loss carry-forwards are limited to five 
years.  There is little prospect of utilizing the deferred-tax asset by showing genuine profit 
in the near future, so it should be written off. 
Third, most of banks' subordinated loans are held by friendly life insurance 
companies.  The banks, in turn, hold subordinated loans and surplus notes of the life 
companies.  This is double-gearing and the cross-held quasi-capital should not be treated as 
genuine capital for either the banks or the life insurance companies. 
Table 4 shows core (tier-1) capital adjusted for unrealized capital gains, under 
reserving, and deferred taxes for major Japanese banks since March 1998. On this calculation, 
eight banks had negative equity in 1998, but only two were nationalized. The capital ratio 
recovered in fiscal 1998, part due to the ¥6.2 trillion in capital injected by the government, 




of more loans going bad and stock prices falling. In September 2001 was at 0.86%, below 
where it had been 3 years earlier. 
The capital position of banks is quite sensitive to stock prices.  Table 5 shows the 
capital structure of all commercial banks.  Core capital based on traditional historical cost 
accounting is adjusted for unrealized capital gains on stocks,  deferred taxes, the public 
capital injection, and under-reserving for loan losses.  Although banks show ¥29.3 trillion of 
capital on their balance sheet at the end of March 2002, this figure is inflated with ¥10.7 
trillion of deferred-tax credits (present  value of the future tax shelter), ¥6.9 trillion of 
under-reserving, and ¥7.2 trillion of government capital.  Removing these amounts, the 
privately held equity of the banking sector is only ¥4.5 trillion yen.  This is very small 
compared to their ¥71.8 trillion of problem loans. 
Because the ¥34.4 trillion market value of stocks held by banks is about 7.5 times 
their net capital, a 10% fall in the stock price index wipes out about 76% of their net capital.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, unrealized capital gains (the difference between column A 
and B) was very large and banks could withstand fluctuations in stock prices.  However, in 
the 1990s, banks sold stock to realize gains to offset huge loan losses.  The increase in book 
value of shares (column B) during the 1990s shows the banks were buying back most of the 
stock they sold.   
 
2.1  An Unprofitable Business 
 
Banking in Japan has become an unprofitable, structurally depressed industry.  Excluding 
capital gains realized by selling shares and real estate, Japan's banks as a group have been in 
the red since the year ended March 1994 (fiscal 1993).  The primary cause of this is low 
interest rates, which are squeezing profits. 
Let us look at the profit structure of banks nation-wide.  Table 6 shows the 
profit-loss accounts of all commercial banks.  In the nine years from fiscal 1992 to fiscal 
2000, banks made around ¥10 trillion each year as lending margin (row A, defined as interest 
and dividends earned minus interest paid).  Revenue from such sources as bond and 
currency dealing and service charges were over ¥2 trillion, and ¥3 trillion more recently (row 
B). This includes all other revenue except capital gains realized on stocks and real estate.  
Revenues from banks' principal operations therefore amount to roughly ¥12 trillion to ¥13 




Total costs – including personnel and other operating expenses – were over ?7 
trillion (row C).  Operating costs declined during 1998-2000 because of cost cutting 
measures.  It is likely to be difficult to continue that pace of cost cutting.  Certainly, 
the banks may cut labor costs further by reducing employment and cutting average 
compensation. But the banks have to invest heavily in information technology to remain 
competitive. 
In the 1990s bank stinted on improving systems because of preoccupation with 
bad-loan problems, and now they have poor quality computer systems.  Thus,  for 
example, the zengin electronic fund transfer system, which is the main payment system 
among bank customers, cannot handle 2-byte codes, so it cannot send customer names 
and messages in kanji (characters).)  As a result, more and more payments (especially 
utility bills) are handled by convenience store chains, which have installed sophisticated 
terminals. 
Since the early 1990s more and more loans held by banks have turned into 
non-performing assets.  Banks have suffered over ¥6 trillion in loan losses each year 
since fiscal 1994, and ¥9 trillion in the last year (row E).  As a result, banks have not 
reported positive net operating profit since fiscal 1993 (row F).  However, because of 
occasional realization of capital gains on stocks and real estate (row G), banks have 
shown a positive bottom line (row F + row G). 
 
 
3  Causes of Bank Unprofitability 
 
The profit margin of Japanese banks is too small to cover the increase in default risk 
since the bubble burst. Two principal elements of this – the deregulation that has been 
going on since the 1980s and competition from government-sponsored financial 
institutions – are taken up in the following sections. 
The nature of government regulation is a third factor. Thus, under the terms and 
condition of the government capital injection in March 1999, banks are legally required 
to maintain and increase loans to small and medium firms. Shinsei Bank, which reduced 
loans to such firms, was ordered by the FSA to increase its lending.  Under these 
conditions, banks often disregard their procedures to make new loans to small 
companies, at ultimate cost to the banks and the economy as a whole because of the 
misallocation of resources. 
 
 




3.1  Effects of Deregulation 
 
The average lending rate of Japanese banks was 1.8% in fiscal 2000, while the average 
funding cost was 0.3% and the average intermediation cost was 1.2%.  Thus, the gross 
spread was only 0.35% (Japanese Bankers Association 2001).  The average credit 
rating of borrowers from banks is about BB, the annual loan loss rate is well over 1%, 
which means a negative margin of 0.65%. Part of this is offset by fees from borrowers 
and other customers, but a key fact is that the banks are making losses from lending. 
One of the reasons for the small gross spread is the overhang of deposit interest 
rate controls until the early 1990s.  When the government controlled deposit rates, 
banks easily made money taking deposits. This is seen in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 decomposes the lending margin (interest earned minus interest paid) 
into regulatory rent and the true profit margin (the spread between the average lending 
rate and the market rate).  The regulatory rent is taken as the difference between the 
banks' funding cost and the risk-free short-term money market rate. Notice that the true 
len ding margin in much of the 1980s was negative, which suggests banks passed part of 
the rent on to borrowers 
As deposit-rate controls were phased out in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
banks tried to keep up profit margins by increasing lending rates relative to short-term 
market rates. 
Although the banks have not raised their profit margin, borrowers are paying a 
higher interest rate in relation to the money market rate.  Figure 5 shows movements of 
the average new lending rate, overnight call rate, and the  implied ex post real interest 
rates computed by  subtracted the GDP deflator inflation rate.  Reflecting the BOJ's 
loose monetary policy, the real call rate fell from 1991 until 1998.  On the other hand, 
the real rate of new lending has not fallen much because of the increasing gap between 
the new lending rate and the call rate. 
Although the opportunity cost of borrowing for large creditworthy companies is 
close to the call rate, the cost for small and medium companies is close to the new 
lending rate.  Therefore, smaller companies have been less able than larger ones to 
enjoy the expansionary effect of loose money.  This may have contributed to the 
relatively weak recovery of the small-business sector in the 1990s. 
It was natural for banks to raise lending  rates relative to market rates after 
removal of deposit rate controls.  However, banks have not succeeded in obtaining 
enough of a margin to cover loan losses in a weak economy.  At the same time, smaller 
borrowers have suffered from higher borrowing costs relative to large companies that 




3.2  Government Financial Institutions 
 
In Japanese financial markets, the presence of government financial institutions (GFIs) 
is extremely large.  Table 7 shows the market share of private banks and GFIs at the 
end of 2000. 
In the loan market, the GFI share reaches 30% to 40% in rural prefectures, 
although it is only 26% overall. GFIs make very long-term loans at about 2%.  They 
are especially dominant in housing loans, holding more than half the outstanding 
balance. 
Table 8 shows the base lending rates of GFIs on 9 February 2001.  Their rates 
on new lending are similar to those for short-term loans from private banks, but the 
average term is much longer. 
GFIs obtain subsidies of about ¥1 trillion per year as direct subsidy and indirect 
subsidy of zero-cost capital. These are estimated to provide a 60 basis point cost 
advantage relative to private financial institutions. Further, they usually accept 
prepayment without penalties, so their loans are more attractive to borrowers. As a 
result, the rates banks can charge are significantly constrained. (See Higo (2001) on the 
role of GFIs and their institutional details.) 
In the deposit market, the Postal Saving System (PSS) is a dominant player.  
Deposits are fully guaranteed by the government.  Rates are set competitively against 
private deposit-taking institutions.  There are more than 24,000 post offices, giving the 
system a branch network larger than all the  city  and regional banks combined.  The 
largest private banking group, Mizuho, has only about 600 offices.  The PSS does not 
charge account-maintenance fees, so it is difficult for private banks to charge such fees 
without alienating a large number of customers. 
My calculations indicate banks have to raise their lending margin by 80 to 100 
basis points to break even in the current economic environment of deflation and 
recession. 
The loan losses in Table 6 for 1999 and 2000 understate true losses by some ¥1.5 
trillion each year due to under-reserving for bad loans.  Therefore, banks lost about ¥3 
trillion in each of those years before capital gains.    Macroeconomic conditions 
deteriorated in 2001, so banks reported more than 9 trillion yen of loan losses in FY 
2001 alone, partly recognizing the past understated losses. 
By raising lending rates 100 basis points, banks can obtain an additional ¥5 
trillion from their ¥500 trillion loan portfolio, which would allow them to write-off bad 
loans as they surface.  However, they can neither raise lending rates nor charge higher 




accelerates, banks will run out of capital sooner or later and the government will be 
forced to take control of the sector. 
 
 
4  Life Insurance Companies 
 
Private life insurers are the second largest part of the financial services industry after 
commercial banks, with December 2000 total assets of ¥180 trillion, which is about 
35% of GDP.  Limited competition and the robust economy allowed life insurance 
companies to enjoy fairly high growth and reasonably good profits until the early 1990s.  
Before the current crisis, there were 20 established companies, almost all organized as 
mutual companies. 
Although the companies are less affected by the bad loan problem than banks, 
they face a serious problem. In the late 1980s and early 1990s they  effectively  sold 
massive amounts of what are forward-rate agreement options.  The most important 
insurance products sold by Japanese companies in the 1980s and early 90s were 
whole-life insurance with term rider and long-term annuities. Moreover, most of them 
are sold as monthly payment plan.  These promised high minimum guaranteed returns 
(yotei riritsu) over the life of a policy.   As a result, life insurance companies effectively 
guaranteed high returns on future cash flow.    Thus, until 1992, major Japanese 
life-insurance companies assumed a return on their assets of 5.5% or more  in designing 
policies.  In  1992 someone buying even a life annuity  or whole-life insurance  was 
guaranteed 5.5% by all the companies. 
The profitability of an annuity to its issuer depends on the difference between 
assumed and actual results of three factors: return on invested assets, costs, and death 
rates.  For cautious actuaries, assumed death rates and operating costs tend to be higher 
than actual rates. This provides some cushion for any short-fall in expected investment 
returns. However, for many insurers, the shortfalls in asset returns were too big to be 
covered. 
Most companies did not match the terms of their assets and liabilities. Generally, 
the term on the asset side has been about 5 years, while the average on the liability side 
has been 15 to 20 years.  When interest rates fell sharply in the 1990s, firms faced 
massive negative carry.  Some companies were operating with little or no equity by the 
late 1990s. When they finally filed bankruptcy, most were deeply insolvent. 
Beginning with the collapse of Nissan Life in April 1997, seven insurers had 
failed by mid 2002. Together they left ¥2.68 trillion in negative equity.  This loss has to 




the contribution by healthier companies.  Table 9 shows the financial conditions of the 
failed companies. Although the companies reported fairly high solvency margins just 
before their failures, all were found to be insolvent after their bankruptcy.  Table 10 
shows solvency margins.   Note that no company has failed since March 2001. 
When a life insurance company fails, the court-appointed administrator cuts the 
liability of the company so as to make the company viable again.  Most of the liability 
of an insurance company is policy reserve that corresponds to the accumulated saving of 
policyholders.  Generally speaking, the surrender value of a policy corresponds to this 
value.  Under the Japanese policyholder protection scheme, the PPF guarantees only 
90% of the policy reserve and it does not protect guaranteed minimum returns.  The 
PPF can also introduce a cancellation penalty on the policy reserve to reduce the cost of 
resolution. 
As a result, p olicyholders at bankrupt insurers  are hit on three sides.  On 
average, they  have lost about 10% of their accrued past saving.  Guaranteed returns in 
most cases were cut down to 1% to 2%.    In addition, heavy early-withdrawal charges 
are levied on cancellations of policies of all types.  In the case of Chiyoda Life, a 
policyholder faces a 20% charge for immediate cancellation.   This charge declines 
gradually to two percent in the tenth year. One must wait 10 years to cancel without an 
early cancellation penalty. Because policyholders can realize the surrender value of 
policies quite easily before a firm fails, companies thought to be weak have faced heavy 
cancellations. 
  It is usually better for a healthy person to quickly cancel a cash -value life 
insurance policy with a failing company and get a new policy elsewhere than to stick to 
the existing policy.  However, getting a new life policy is more expensive, and perhaps 
not possible, for an unhealthy person. This means the burden of an insurer's failure falls 
more heavily on those who have become less insurable. 
 
4.1  Weak Supervision 
 
The life insurance industry's crisis has been exacerbated by the forbearance policy of its 
supervisory authorities, the former Ministry of Finance and the FSA.  Because of 
extremely lenient capital requirements and reluctance to close down unhealthy firms, 
most failed life insurance companies had large negative equity by the time of their 
formal failure. 
The regulatory measure of capital requirements in insurance is the solvency 
margin, which relates  net assets to estimated risk. The  net assets are capital + risk 




future profits + tax effect + subordinated debt.    The estimated risk equals [(insurance 
risk)2 + (interest rate risk + asset value risk)2]½ + management risk. The net assets are 
divided by the estimated risk and multiplied by 200 to obtain the solvency margin. The 
minimum ratio for sound companies is 200. Below that, regulators are required to take 
corrective action. 
The requirement was imported from the United States, but Japanese regulators 
have made a number of modifications that weaken the rule considerably, including 
setting the trigger levels for prompt corrective action much lower.  Table 11 illustrates 
the major differences. 
For a number of reasons the numerator in Japan is overstated.    Especially 
worrisome is inclusion of a large deferred tax asset and future profits. Moreover, Japan 
generously includes assets with no liquidation value, although the US standard excludes 
them. Regarding the denominator side,  Japanese  risk weights are considerably lower 
than those of the United States.  Thus, for publicly traded corporate equity (stock), the 
risk weight is about one-third the US level.    For real estate and foreign currency assets, 
the risk weights are one-half the US levels. 
 
The Financial Studies Group of the Japan Center for Economic Research, which 
I head, have tried to adjust for the differences in the solvency margin requirements in 
Japan and the United States.  The quality of disclosure by life insurance companies has 
improved considerably since the mid 1990s, so we can do this from publicly available 
data.  Figure 6 shows the results for the end of March 2000. 
Based on what they disclose, all the major companies are above the 200% level, 
implying that they are all healthy.  We have made three types of adjustments. The first 
uses US risk weights and adjusts for unrealized capital gains and losses, but allows 
inclusion of assets with no liquidation value.  With these adjustments, two companies 
are deemed insolvent. 
The second is closer to – but still somewhat less stringent than – the US standard.  
Specifically, we removed assets with no liquidation value. Three companies are 
insolvent under this definition. 
The third approach involves removing subordinated debt from the capital base 
because its quality as capital is less than that of retained earnings and surplus notes 
(which are similar to the non -voting redeemable preferred shares of joint stock 
companies).  Under this measure, four companies were insolvent even when the 
Nikkei 225 was at 20,337, significantly higher than it is two years later as this is written. 
Three companies that had negative adjusted solvency margins failed within a 




in March 2001.  The fourth company, Nichidan Life, received a capital injection from 
Axa, a French insurance company. 
Figure 7 shows the same picture for March 2002.  The disclosed ratios are 
more than 500% except for one company. However, "Adjusted 2" indicates that the FSA 
should intervene in at least three weaker companies: Mitsui, Asahi, and Sumitomo Life.  
The Nikkei was 11,025 at that time.  We estimated that a 20% fall in the index would 
pull the solvency margin of weaker companies down by about 100 points. Therefore, a 
Nikkei below 10,000 means three companies probably are critically under-capitalized 
and three others would require prompt corrective actions under US standards. 
 
 
5  Increasing Double-Gearing 
 
All the major life insurance companies are mutual companies, so there is no formal 
cross-holding of shares.  However, the insurers are major shareholders of the banks – 
collectively owning 10% or more of each city bank during the 1990s.   Moreover, 
banks and life insurers have relied on each other to raise broadly defined capital.  
Between March 2000 and March 2001 the bankruptcies of Chiyoda, Kyoei, and Tokyo 
Life reduced the double-gearing, but it is still significant.  At the end of March 2001, 7 
life insurance companies collectively held 5.4 trillion yen of bank stocks and 5.1 trillion 
yen of bank subordinated debts.  In exchange, banks hold 1 trillion yen of surplus 
notes and 1.2 trillion yen of subordinated debts of 7 life insurance companies. 
The double-gearing generates two important problems: poor-quality capital in 
Japan's financial sector, which increases systemic risk, and a weaker governance 
structure of banks. 
As regards systemic risk, suppose a major life insurer filed for bankruptcy.  The 
banks that hold the company's subordinated loans and surplus notes lose money.  The 
price of the stock of these banks falls to reflect the write-offs, which reduces the assets 
of insurance-companies holding bank stocks.  It may even trigger a chain reaction of 
failures among Japanese financial institutions. 
The corporate governance structure of Japan's major life insurance companies is 
weak.  The "representative policyholder meeting" plays the role a shareholder meeting 
does for joint stock companies.  Each representative policyholder has one vote.  They 
are inevitably chosen by management.  Sometimes, they become policyholders only 
after being asked to be a representative policyholder. In other cases, a manager of a 
company that borrows from the insurance company is asked.   





6  Conclusion 
 
Stock prices of listed Japanese banks have been very weak since the end of 2001.  I 
believe that this reflects a number of remaining problems in Japan's financial system. 
First, profit margins are too small to cover the increased default risk since the bubble 
burst more than 10 years ago.  Many firms have not overcome their debt overhang and 
are surviving on the indulgence of their banks.  Banks have not succeeded in 
increasing their lending margins because of strong competitive pressure from 
government-backed financial institutions.  They also are facing strong political 
pressure to lend to small and medium firms regardless of merit. More broadly, revisions 
to the banking law require regulatory approval of new investors, and a condition of 
approval is that they "fully understand a bank's social responsibilities." 
Second, there is massive double-gearing between life insurance companies and 
banks. Systemic risk remains very high.   Financial sector problems can be stabilized 
by public money; either by injecting capital into the banks or by extending a full 
government guarantee of deposits, the government can stabilize the fragile financial 
system.  However, a far larger problem will surface in that event: the critical situation 
of the national debt. Because of deflation an d high real interest rates, the Japanese 
economy is shrinking.  Nominal GDP declined 2% in 2001 and such negative growth 
is likely to continue unless there are very strong policy actions. 
Table 12 shows a simple projection of Japan's budgetary situations under minus 
2% nominal growth and an unchanged primary deficit of 6% of GDP.  I did not take 
account of the cost of stabilizing the financial system, but I did assume a massive 
cutting of government expenditures in line with declining tax revenue.  The gross debt 
of the general government will exceed 200% of GDP by 2008. 
If the government cannot stabilize the macro economy by stopping deflation, I 
expect Japanese yen government bonds (JGB) to be downgraded to speculative by 2007.  
(In July 2002 they had the  lowest rating among major countries: AA- by Standard & 
Poor’s and A2 by Moody’s.)  If downgraded further, the government will have to shift 
to short-term notes to reduce interest costs.  However, shortening maturity will 
increase vulnerability to a sharp rise in interest rates. 
 A junk bond status of JGB will generate enormous problems for the corporate 
sector.  Sovereign credit usually sets a ceiling for private companies.  Japanese banks 
will not be able to use JGBs as collateral in dealing with foreign banks.  Moody's 
downgraded the major banks' financial strength to its lowest ratings on 2 July 2002.  




gold.  The relative weakness of the yen in the face of rapidly declining dollar interest 
rates in 2001 may have indicated a mild form of capital flight. 
Massive capital flight will cure Japan's deflation by sharply devaluing the yen.  
However, other Asian countries will devalue against the dollar to remain competitive.  
That will export deflation to the rest of the world, including the United States.  In that 
event, the United States may have to follow the Japanese example of a zero interest rate 
policy.  
The end of deflation may trigger a budgetary crisis in Japan.  Suppose Japan 
has 200% gross debt, mostly financed by short-term liabilities.  Most of its financial 
assets are long-term and at fixed interest rates, so the government cannot count on a 
higher interest income in the short run under increasing interest rates.  A  500 basis 
point rise in interest rates (which would make rates about the same as they were in 
1991) will increase interest payments to 10% of GDP, ¥50 trillion.  This is about the 
same as total national government tax revenue excluding social security contributions. 
  Many Japanese policy makers and corporate leaders have spent more than 10 
years assuming time will solve whatever the problems are with less pain and cost than 
will aggressive confrontation. Time not only has not solved the problems, it has made 
many of them worse. I would like to say the scenarios I have depicted are pessimistic 
assessments, but sadly they are all too possible.  The pain and the cost will continue to 
grow, as the economy stagnates, unless a more immediate, comprehensive, and 
aggressive attack is made on the known problems. 
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Table 1 
Problem Loans of Japanese Banks
1 
 











c   
  945  1,146  1,402  7,087  3,447  8,402  8,118  2,531  2,732  5,196  Specific reseves
2 
  424  2,090  2,808  5,980  4,316  3,993  4,709  3,865  3,072  3,974  Writen off
3 
A  1,640  3,872  5,332  13,369  7,763  13,258  13,631  6,944  6,108  9,722  Loss from bad loans
4 
A'  1,640  5,512  10,744  24,113  31,877  45,135  58,766  65,710  71,818  81,540  Cumlative losses
5 
B  12,775  13,576  12,546  28,504  21,789  29,858  29,627  30,366  32,515  42,028  Bad loans outstanding
6 
D  3,698  4,547  5,536  13,294  12,334  17,815  14,797  12,230  11,555  13,353  Loan loss reserves 
 
Notes: 
1  Data are for fiscal years ending in March of year shown. 
2  Defined as the reserves held against individual bad loans.   
3  Includes losses from sale of loans to the CCPC (Cooperative Credit Purchase Corp) and other counter parties. 
4  Sum of the two previous rows. 
5  Cumulative total (beginning with fiscal 1992) of losses from bad loans (in row A). 
6  The series is not consistent because the definition and coverage of bad loans has been broadened twice. See notes a, b, and c. (For a detailed look 
at how the data have changed, see Hoshi and Kashyap 1999, section 4.) 
a  Only major banks disclosed loan loss figures. Bad-loan data are for defaulted loans and loans with arrears. 
b  Bad-loan data are for defaulted loans, loans with arrears for more than 6 months, and loans with concessional interest rates below the official 
discount rate of the Bank of Japan.   
c  Bad-loan data are for defaulted loans, loans with arrears for more than 90 days, and loans with concessional terms. (Similar to US rules.) 
 
Source: Data are available from the Financial Services Agency web site [www.fsa.go.jp].    
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Table 2 




a  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002   
  550,000  544,814  487,500  472,388  470,669  490,537  Normal loans 
               
  76,700  71,700  64,258  63,386  65,671  71,087  Classified loans total 
composed of: 
  65,300  65,500  61,024  60,539  63,118  67,787 
  8,700  6,100  3,160  2,835  2,553  3,300 
  2,700  100  74  12  0  0 
  Substandard 
  Doubtful 
  Estimated loss 
 
C  27,350  22,918  19,366  18,828  19,117  20,273 
D  12,334  17,815  14,797  12,230  11,555  13,353 




Under reserved (C-D) 
 
Notes: 
1  Data are for fiscal years ending in March of year shown. 
2  Author's estimates based on 1% of normal loans plus 20% of substandard loans plus 70% of doubtful loans plus 100% of estimated loss loans. 
a  Classifed loan data are based on MOF announcements. 
 
Source: Data are available from the Financial Services Agency web site [www.fsa.go.jp]. 
 








  (percents) 
Classification of   
Loan in March 1994 
Sub-standard  Doubt-ful 
Years later and 
Time (March 
of year shown) 
1.7  27.4  1 year,  1995 
9.8  52.1  2 years, 1996 
16.7  75.3  3 years, 1997 
 
Notes: 
1  Percentage of loans in the classification in March 1994 that had been written off at the end of 
each time period.  Data are for an 18-bank sample. 
 





















level of adjusted 
capital as % assets
1 
2  0  0  0  1  1  less than -2% 
6  2  0  0  0  3  -2 to less than 0% 
8  2  0  0  1  4  subtotal, insolvent 
 
8  10  4  5  8  11  0 to less than 2% 
3  5  9  10  6  0  2% to less than 4% 
0  0  4  0  0  0  4% to less than 6% 
 
19  17  17  15  15  15  Total number of banks 
 
0.93  2.07  3.48  2.36  1.83  0.86  Weighted average % 
 
Last day of months shown. Fiscal 1997 ended 31 March 1998, etc. 
1  Adjusted capital is defined as core capital plus unrealized capital gains and losses plus loan 
loss reserves minus estimated loan losses minus deferred tax asset. As in Table 2, estimated 
loan losses is defined as 1% of normal loans plus 20% of substandard loans plus 70% of 
doubtful loans plus 100% of estimated loss loans.  Individual banks do not disclose data on 
classified loans individually, so I relied on disclosed bad loan data. 
 
Source: Updated by the author from JCER 2001. 
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Table 5 
Stock portfolios and capital in the banking sector 



















held by the 
government 
F 






Mar-86  46.9  11.9  12.3  0.0  NA  0.0  33.3  15860 
Mar-87  63.7  13.4  13.8  0.0  NA  0.0  44.0  21567 
Mar-88  77.6  17.6  17.2  0.0  NA  0.0  53.2  26260 
Mar-89  97.1  23.2  22.5  0.0  NA  0.0  66.8  32839 
Mar-90  88.6  29.7  28.6  0.0  NA  0.0  63.9  29980 
Mar-91  77.7  33.1  30.2  0.0  NA  0.0  57.0  26292 
Mar-92  56.4  34.5  31.3  0.0  NA  0.0  44.4  19346 
Mar-93  56.4  34.5  31.8  0.0  NA  0.0  44.9  18591 
Mar-94  61.9  36.5  32.3  0.0  NA  0.0  47.5  19112 
Mar-95  52.0  39.8  32.3  0.0  NA  0.0  39.6  15140 
Mar-96  64.3  43.0  27.9  0.0  NA  0.0  40.7  21407 
Mar-97  54.1  42.9  28.5  0.0  15.0  0.0  20.2  18003 
Mar-98  50.8  45.7  24.5  0.0  5.1  0.3  22.2  16527 
Mar-99  47.1  42.7  33.7  8.4  4.6  6.3  17.1  15837 
Mar-00  54.5  44.4  35.2  8.1  6.6  6.9  19.7  20337 
Mar-01  44.5  44.3  36.7  7.3  7.6  7.1  14.8  13000 
Mar-02  34.4  34.4  29.3  10.7  6.9  7.2  4.5  11025 
Source of data:  Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan, "Analysis of Bank Financial Statements," various issues; securities reports for 
individual banks. Both market and book values represent listed shares only.  The Table pertains to banking accounts of all banks in 
Japan. 
Note:  The market value of stock portfolios was not published prior to March 1990, so we have estimated backwards using the Niikkei 225 share price 
index from the end of March 1991. However, the tables for 1985-1986 should be discounted, because bank stock portfolios have been gradually 
increasing, so that values estimated from the end of fiscal 1990 will have an upwards bias the father back one goes. 40% corporate tax rate is 
assumed.  See Table 2 for the estimation of under reserving.    
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Table 6 
Profitability of Japanese Banking Sector 
 
(trillion yen)   
  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001   
A  7.5  7.1  8.9  9.8  9.2  9.7  10.8  10.7  10.0  9.6  9.7  9.4  9.8  Lending margin 
B  2.5  2.6  2.2  2.5  2.8  2.1  3.3  3.7  3.6  3.1  2.5  3.0  3.1  Other revenue
1 
C  6.6  7.1  7.5  7.7  7.7  7.8  7.8  8.0  8.0  7.5  7.3  7.1  7.0  Operating costs 
  3.5  3.7  3.9  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.6  3.5  3.4  3.2    Salaries and wages (part of C) 
D  3.3  2.6  3.5  4.5  4.3  4.0  6.3  6.4  5.6  5.2  4.9  5.3  5.9  Gross profit =A+B-C 
E  1.4  0.8  1.0  2.0  4.6  6.2  13.3  7.3  13.5  13.5  6.3  6.6  9.4  Loan losses 
F  1.9  1.8  2.5  2.5  -0.4  -2.2  -7.0  -1.0  -7.9  -8.3  -1.4  -1.3  -3.5  Net operating profit =D-E 
G  2.8  2.0  0.7  0.0  2.0  3.2  4.4  1.2  3.6  1.4  3.8  1.4  -2.4  Realized capital gains
2 
  4.7  3.8  3.3  2.5  1.7  1.0  -2.6  0.2  -4.2  -6.9  2.3  0.1  -5.9  Net profit =F+G 
 
  943.6  927.6  914.4  859.5  849.8  845.0  848.2  856.0  848.0  759.7  737.2  804.3  772.0  Assets 
  ..  424.3  445.8  460.3  472.3  477.8  482.7  482.3  477.9  472.6  463.4  456.9  465.0  Outstanding loans
3 
 
Note: Financial Statement of All Commercial Banks. 
Data are for fiscal years, which end in March of following calendar year. 
1  Includes all other profit, such as trading for own account and fees, but excludes capital gains realized from stock and real estate sales (which are in 
row G). 
2  From sale of stocks and real estate. 
3  Domestic banks only. 
 
Source: JCER 2001, updated by the author. 
 





Size of Government and Private Financial Institutions, 2000 
 
Assets   
Trillion 
yen 
as %   
of GDP 
Market   
share   
(%) 
 
Loans       
  163  32  26  Government 
  464  90  74  Private banks 
  627  122  -  Total 
         
Deposits       
  255  50  34  Postal Savings System 
  486  95  66  Private banks 
  741  144  -  Total 
         
Life Insurance       
  119  23  40  Postal Life 
  180  35  60  Private insurers 
  299  58  -  Total 
 
Computed by the author from calendar year-end data in BOJ Financial and Economics Statistics 







Lending Rates of Government Lending Agencies, 9 Feb 2001 
 
Basic loan rate   
(%) 
Average term   
(yrs) 
 
2.05  16.7  Japan Development Bank 
2.05  7.3  People's Finance Corp 
2.05  8.9  Japan Finance Corp for Small Business 
1.9  ..  Japan Finance Corp for Municipal Enterprises 
2.7  25.4  Housing Loan Corp 
 
2.12  <1  Average of all private banks 
4.65  20  Fixed rate housing loan from Fuji Bank 
 
All rates are fixed except the average of all private banks. 
 
Source: JCER 2001. 
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Table 9 
Failed Life Insurance Companies   
Condition at the time of Bankruptcy 
 
Name    Nissan  Toho  Daihyaku  Taisho  Chiyoda  Kyoei  Tokyo 
Legal Structure  Mutual  Mutual  Mutual  LLC  Mutual  LLC  Mutual 
               
Date of Failure  Apr-97  Jun-98  May-00  May-00  Oct-00  Oct-00  Mar-01 
               
Asset (trillion yen)  1.82  2.19  1.30  0.15  2.23  3.73  0.69 
Equity (trillion yen)  -0.32  -0.65  -0.32  -0.03  -0.60  -0.69  -0.07 
               
Disclosed solvency  margin (SM)  N.A.  154  305  68  263  211  447 
Date associate with the SM  N.A.  Mar-98  Mar-99  Mar-00  Mar-00  Mar-00  Mar-00 
               
Reduction of reserves by bankruptcy  0%  10%  10%  10%  10%  8%  0% 
               
Average guaranteed Return before failure  3.75-5.5%  4.79%  4.46%  4.05%  3.70%  4.00%  4.20% 
Guaranteed return after failure  2.75%  1.50%  1.00%  1.00%  1.50%  1.75%  2.60% 
               
Early withdrawal charges (EWC)  15%?3%  15%?2%  20%?2%  15%?3%  20%?2%  15%?2%  20%?2% 
Period of EWC  7 years  8 years  10 years  10 years  10 years  8 years  10 years 
 
Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research, Deflation and the Financial System Reform, October 2001. 
Note: LLC stands for limited liability company. The sliding scale for the early withdrawal charges is described in the text. 





Solvency Margins of Major Life Insurers 
 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Company
1 
154.3  -  -  -  -  Toho 
294.6  304.6  -  -  -  Daihyaku 
314.2  396.1  263.1  -  -  Chiyoda 
300.7  343.2  210.6  -  -  Kyoei 
431.6  478.7  446.7  -  -  Tokyo 
           
654.8  688.8  732.7  543.4  417.6  Asahi 
1016.8  998.0  1004.2  757.6  772.0  Daido 
632.1  662.1  858.6  682.3  593.0  Daiichi 
722.4  820.6  906.5  779.3  708.2  Fukoku 
719.9  706.1  731.0  667.2  609.4  Meiji 
491.6  519.6  676.7  492.7  510.7  Mitsui 
939.9  849.9  1095.8  778.1  714.4  Nippon 
526.2  589.5  675.7  551.3  534.5  Sumitomo 
873.0  869.1  1050.3  806.8  768.2  Taiyo 
648.1  727.2  808.5  602.6  612.8  Yasuda 
 
The first five are listed in the order in which they went bankrupt. Others are listed 
alphabetically. 
 
1  "Life" is the second word in the names of all these companies. 
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Table 11 
Comparison of US and Japanese Capital Requirements for Life Insurance Companies 
 
  US RBC regulation  Japanese Solvency 
Margin regulation 
Assets of no liquidation value   
in the net asset calculation 
   Deferred tax asset  Not allowed  Allowed 
   Movable property  Not allowed  Allowed 
   Future profit  Not allowed  One year profit until March 2000;   
half year profit is allowed since then 
Unrealized losses 
   in domestic bonds  Deducted from asset  Not deducted from assets 
until March 2001 
   in foreign securities  Deducted from asset  Not deducted from assets 
until March 2001 
 
Weights for market risk 
   Stocks  22.5-45%  10% 
   Foreign bonds  10%  5% 
   Real estates  10%  5% 
 
Trigger levels for the initiation   
of prompt corrective actions 
   No action  250%  200% 
   Submit plans for improvements  150-250%  100-200% 
   Stronger intervention  70-150%  0-100% 
   Authority takes over the control  Less than 70%  Less than 0% 
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Table 12 









to GDP Ratio 
General Government 
Gross Debt 
to GDP Ratio 
General Government 
Net Debt 
to GDP Ratio 
Effective Interest 
Rate on Net Debt 
Net Interest Cost 
to GDP Ratio 
1999  -0.6  -5.7  120.4  36.0  3.5  1.3 
2000  -0.1  -6.8  130.7  43.5  3.3  1.4 
2001  -1.9  -5.9  142.0  51.0  2.9  1.5 
2002  -2.0  -6.0  150.6  59.6  2.5  1.5 
2003  -2.0  -6.0  159.3  68.3  2.1  1.4 
2004  -2.0  -6.0  168.1  77.1  2.1  1.6 
2005  -2.0  -6.0  177.4  86.4  2.3  2.0 
2006  -2.0  -6.0  187.2  96.2  2.7  2.6 
2007  -2.0  -6.0  197.8  106.8  3.0  3.2 
2008  -2.0  -6.0  209.2  118.2  4.0  4.7 




Note:  Figures until 2001 are based on IMF, World Economic Outlook and OECD, Economic Outlook. 
  General government gross asset is assumed to be constant after 2001.   
  Sharp downgradings of JGB are assumed after 2005. 























1)  Japan: fiscal year, US:  calendar 
year 
2)  Figures after FY 1997 do not include data of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, 
Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa Bank, Fukutoku Bank, and Midori Bank. 
3)  Japanese bad loan ratio = Risk control loans/total loans US bad loan ratio = (loans with 
arrears for more than 90 days + loans that do not count accrued interest rates as asset + 
restructured loans)/total loans. 
 
Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under Deflation, March 2001 
(in Japanese). 
























1)  Japan: fiscal year, US: calendar year 
2)  Figures after FY 1997 do not include data of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, 
Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa Bank, Fukutoku Bank, and Midori Bank. 
3)  Japanese bad loan ratio = Risk control loans/total loans US bad loan ratio = (loans with 
arrears for more than 90 days + loans that do not count accrued interest rates as asset + 
restructured loans)/total loans. 
 
Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under Deflation, March 2001 
(in Japanese). 









Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under Deflation, March 2001 
(in Japanese). 
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Source:  Ikuko Fueda, “Financial liberalization, asset bubble, and bank behavior,” in M. Fukao 
and JCER ed, Empirical Analysis of Financial Recession,” Japan Economic Journal, 









Note:  Real interest rates are calculated by subtracting GDP deflator inflation rates from 
nominal interest rates. 
  The GDP deflator inflation rate is adjusted for changes in consumption tax rates in 1989 
and 1997. 
 
Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under Deflation, March 2001 
(in Japanese). 























Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research,  Structural Problems of Japanese Financial 

















Source:  Japan Center for Economic Research, Weakening Japanese Financial System, October 
2002 (in Japanese). 